Introduction
Amendment rules are a requisite feature of constitutional text. In that regard, the British North America Act or Canada Act, 1867 stands almost alone among constitutions of the world in not prescribing rules for its amendment.
1 It was not so jarring an omission when four colonies joined in federal union under a constitution enacted by the British Parliament, and were first in the British Empire to earn Dominion status. 2 Over time, the text was modified twenty-one times by UK legislation before amending rules empowering Canada to change its own Constitution were added. by a noisy contest to define Canada's constitutional core and even to break Confederation apart.
The high-stakes drama of 1982, threat of Quebec separation, and denouement of the postpatriation Accords were events of singular urgency. By dominating the literature, these events consigned the longer history of amendment to the background.
7
Now that the crisis years have receded, fresh insight is emerging through a process of generational renewal in the scholarship. 8 This article joins that movement by exploring Canada's two uneven periods of constitutional change -before and after textual change. In drawing that longer history back into the discussion, it theorizes that rich insights into the riddles of Canada's amendment constitutionalism are found in the interface between the legality or formality of amendment, and its legitimacy or acceptance. While much of the literature on constitutional amendment is focused on textual rules and design variables, this article takes a different path. Before turning to the rhythms of Canada's amendment experience it offers a primer on the foundational concepts of legality and legitimacy, and their alignment in the constitutional setting. The analysis then addresses how those concepts have aligned over Canada's amendment history, before and after textual rules. The discussion takes its initial cue from the 1867 Constitution, which was incomplete as constitutional text for failing to include amendment rules. In default of rules, the Constitution was amended through a process of statutory legality which served, until 1982, as a proxy for constitutional legality, or textual amending rules. The legitimacy of amendment by UK legislative process was accepted, though more as a stopgap and with increasing discomfort after Canada's independence in 1931.
9
The absence of rules had profound implications for Canadian constitutionalism and how the Constitution was perceived. Throughout this period Canada lacked amendment sovereignty because the Constitution could not amend itself. 10 This gap in legality also presented acute legitimacy issues in a federal system of divided sovereignty between federal and provincial levels of government. In formal terms, the protracted search for amendment rules was about Act, 1982, supra note 3, ss.38-49 (prescribing the rules for amendment which are referred to, collectively, as the amending formula). Note that some changes and amendments could be undertaken domestically prior to 1982; infra note 31.
12 The Accords failed on compound grounds of legality and legitimacy; the obstacles of legality might have been overcome had either or both Accords been able to muster sufficient legitimacy in the political community. See infra notes 74-77, 79, and 81 (citing scholarly analyses of the reasons the Accords failed).
comparative constitutionalism. At a minimum, its symmetrical attention to these concepts -and constitutional legitimacy in particular -is distinctive in a literature that focuses on the text and how design variables affect amendment rigidity. 13 As others have pointed out, by privileging the legality of amendment, textual singularity necessarily discounts the role of ambient political and constitutional culture as an agent of change. 14 In providing an experiential analysis of Canada's amendment history this article exposes the limits of legality, engages legitimacy as a critical variable in constitutional change, and piques interest in how these concepts align in the setting of constitutional amendment.
Legality, legitimacy and constitutionalism
Law's authority derives from its legality and legitimacy, two concepts which can be but are not necessarily in harmony. Legality describes law's qualities by reference to the rules or requirements set out in formal or positive instruments, documents and enactments. Their terms may be complex, opaque or contested, but laws nonetheless prescribe the conditions and prerequisites to the exercise of authority. Of the two, legitimacy may be more elusive because it describes a law's quality or quotient of authoritative value. Though defined in variable terms, legitimacy is concerned with the status of a law or rule and whether its claim to regulate, Where amendment is concerned, constitutional legality and legitimacy are aligned, generally, when the text prescribes rules that enable change within a framework of durability that sufficiently represents and respects the values and choices of a political community. This should explain why it is anomalous for a written constitution not to include amendment rules and difficult to imagine how legality and legitimacy might align in such a system. In other words, amending a written text is bound to be problematic when there is no basis in legality to inform the legitimacy of change. Putting it in Weber's terms, a text without rules would require belief in a legality that does not exist.
In Canada's case, the Constitution's silence did not preclude textual change as amendments were achieved through a process of statutory legality. Despite its workability a subconstitutional process that could not be equated with constitutional legality led to shortfalls in the legitimacy of constitutional amendment over time. 28 Amendment is a core function of constitutionalism and Canada's lack of amendment sovereignty had serious implications for the capacity and legitimacy of constitutional change, especially after independence. Moreover, the Constitution established a federal union, but the text's failure to provide rules formally excluded 27 The American constitutional tradition attests that some of the most profound controversies about the legitimacy of change are provoked by judicial review and constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Brown v. the provinces from the process of amendment. Without legality in the domain of federalism, the legitimacy of amendments affecting provincial sovereignty was unavoidably open to serious question. 29 The lack of constitutional legality became progressively more incapacitating until the process of amendment was stopped prior to 1982, pending the adoption of rules.
The challenge deepened when a fresh legitimacy variable surfaced during negotiations on patriation. Though not a vital factor before 1982, the federal government's proposal for a referendum promoted democratic participation or popular sovereignty as an embryonic, or alternative way to legitimize transformative change. The rise of popular legitimacy affected both Accords which failed, in large part, because of a profound lack of confidence in constitutional renewal at multiple levels -from the process and substance of reform to complex synergies of federalism, regionalism, and democratic participation.
According to Fallon, the foundations of contemporary constitutional legitimacy "necessarily lie in current states of affairs" and are "more uncertain and contingent" than is assumed. 30 While his conception examined its legal, sociological and moral varieties, the key variables at play in Canada's history of constitutional legitimacy concern elements of sovereignty: the sovereignty or authority to amend the Constitution, or amendment sovereignty; the sovereignty principles of federalism, including provincial sovereignty; and the role of popular sovereignty. Separately, in combination, and over time, these elements are the key to 29 As Premier Allan Blakeney declared, "in a federal state, the procedure for amending the constitution is the most important part of the fundamental law; that I think is self-evident really". Quoted in Peter Oliver, "Canada, Quebec, and Constitutional Amendment", U. T.L.J., 49 (1999), 519-60, 520 ["Canada, Quebec"] . 30 Fallon, "Legitimacy", supra note 21, 1852.
Canada's history of constitutional amendment. From Confederation to the present, defining and aligning the legality and legitimacy of these sovereignties has been the primary burden of Canadian constitutionalism.
Statutory legality: 1867 to 1982
Alignment between the law and legitimacy of amendment is therefore a challenge, in principle, for a text that does not authorize change. For Canada the starting point is 1867 and a
Constitution that failed to provide rules for its amendment. 31 Whether it was a blunder or more an oversight at the time, the omission was costly and difficult to remedy. 32 Statutory legality offered a workaround that bridged the textual gap and legitimized amendments to the Constitution between 1867 and 1931. There were diminishing returns to its legitimacy after independence, and by the 1960s the lack of rules had rendered the process functionally illegitimate: after 1964 the Constitution was not amended again until 1964. The dilemma throughout was this: while statutory legality was sub-constitutional, the lack of constitutional rules created a vacuum which complicated the task of developing a scheme of amendment legality that would be accepted as legitimate. 32 McWhinney describes it as a "major blunder" which "undoubtedly stemmed from the ignorance of British constitutional lawyers with the problems of written constitutions and the practical necessity of having amendment formulae built in"; Canada and the Constitution, supra note 7, pp. 65. Oliver, by contrast, suggests that it was "not likely to have been an oversight". "Canada, Quebec", supra note 29, 526-27.
Confederation was an initiative of four colonies that expressed their "Desire to be federally united into One Dominion" under British authority, with a Constitution "Similar in of domestic governance. The UK never exercised its disallowance power or amended the Constitution without Canada's consent, as it was legally entitled to do, and soon after Confederation the UK agreed to act on the federal government's requests for amendments to the BNA Act. 38 In this way, Britain fettered its legal power through a convention accepting Canada's authority to determine when and how the BNA Act would be amended.
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Because it was concerned with the relationship between imperial authority and a selfgoverning Dominion the UK convention treated the federal government as the legitimate source of authority on amendment. The convention was political rather than legal in nature and did not contemplate substantive review to ensure that proposed amendments complied with the Constitution. 40 An interesting parallel is revealed in the chain of legality, from the UK to the federal government, and the federal government to the provinces: just as the federal government had no legal power to prevent the UK from amending the Constitution, the lack of textual rules meant that the provinces had no authority to prevent unilateral amendment by the federal government. While the UK amendment convention accepted that Britain could not exercise its legal powers without undercutting Canada's constitutional autonomy, there was no parallel recognition that unilateral federal amendment could undermine the sovereignty of the provinces. The BNA Act left the provinces powerless and without a voice on constitutional reform.
Though amendments were infrequent in the early years of Confederation, the provinces began to resist the assumption that the amendment function was controlled by the federal government. accompanied by a statutory asterisk preserving its dependence on the UK for amendments to the Constitution.
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By out-sourcing textual amendments to a foreign sovereign after independence, Canada accepted a stunning and unusual limit on its authority. It is overlooked, because not described as such, that Westminster's BNA Act exceptionalism was formally and in functional terms an amending formula. 52 As a formula it was dysfunctional, because it continued the status quo of statutory legality and retained the trappings of colonial subservience. Despite the irregularity, the Westminster amending formula had legitimacy because it created a form of legality that prevented self-interested parties to Canada's federal union from undercutting constitutional promises through ordinary statutory actions. 53 More to the point, s.7's BNA Act exception codified the principle -by agreement of the federal government and provinces -that constitutional legality was necessary to legitimize amendments to the Constitution. 54 Until that could be achieved, the imperial monitor would remain in place to protect the integrity of Canadian federalism. In this way, the status quo served as a placeholder on amendment which 51 Supra note 45. Section 7(1) states: "Nothing in this Act [i.e., granting independence] shall be deemed to apply to the repeal, amendment or alteration of the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930, or any order, rule or regulation made thereunder".
recognized the stake of the provinces, in the era of Canadian independence, in the process and substance of constitutional amendment. Whatever might be said of placing faith in an amendment protocol which had excluded the provinces for more than 60 years, this development was symbolically important and marked an important evolution in Canadian federalism.
In concluding, in 1980, that "[w] hether a convention requiring provincial consents to altering the distribution of powers has become established practice is not entirely clear").
Desperately unsuccessful negotiations would bring Canada to the brink in 1981. Events
had demonstrated that the legality and legitimacy of constitutional amendment simply could not be aligned. As a matter of formal legality, Canada's Constitution could still be amended by a foreign sovereign, acting at the request of a federal government that chose to disregard the terms of the Constitution and interests of the provinces. Amendments undertaken through that process would heighten misalignment between the two by satisfying the requirements of legality but in doing so manifestly lacking legitimacy.
Constitutional legality: patriation and the Accords
Short of unanimity, a scheme of amendment legality that would satisfy the provinces could not be found. In due course, fault for the amendment impasse would be attributed to the politicians who, "despite intermittent efforts since 1927 and very intensive efforts since 1968", were unwilling to set aside jealousies and differences to work together on domestic amendment rules. 59 By the 1970s, a self-reinforcing history of failed negotiations was aggravated by the rise of militance among the provinces. 60 The collapse of negotiations yet again, shortly after Quebec's May 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association, enabled Prime Minister Trudeau to claim the "political high ground" for unilateralism when he introduced the federal government's 59 Hogg, "Constitutional Crisis", ibid., 286. Frustration is also evident in remarks by Pierre Trudeau, who
commented on "what enormous amounts of bile and wasted time constitutional conferences had produced … only to discover how impossible it was to get [the first ministers] to agree on a constitutional amending formula"; quoted in Graham, The Last Act, supra note 7, 15.
unilateral patriation plan. 61 That plan was designed to unblock constitutional reform by challenging the provinces and the tyranny of unanimity.
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This act of constitutional derring-do willed a breakthrough on patriation by joining the federal government's authority to request amendments with a legitimizing referendum on the amending formula. 63 The referendum option not only gave the federal government leverage against the provinces but deflected their sovereignty in favour of two other sources of legitimacy:
the federal government's legitimacy to act on its legal authority, as representative of the Canadian people; and the democratic authority of an inclusive, nationwide referendum. Though patriation was achieved without a referendum, the appeal to direct democracy and the "people's constitution or people's package," as the proposal was styled, fundamentally altered the dynamics of constitutional reform. From that point on, popular legitimacy played an increasingly important role in shaping and determining the success or failure of constitutional reform.
61 Graham, The Last Act, supra note 7, pp. 68. The key elements of the plan were an amending formula, which would serve to patriate the Constitution, and a charter of rights. Also note for clarity that all references in this article are to Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau and not to the current Prime Minister, his son Justin Trudeau.
Eight of the ten provinces opposed patriation by taking the federal government, and once the Supreme Court of Canada confusingly decreed that unilateral patriation was both legal and unconstitutional their role could no longer be circumvented. 64 By endorsing its legality but rejecting the legitimacy of the federal proposal a splintered Court wittingly or unwittingly played a vital role in brokering the patriation deal. 65 The Patriation Reference's judicial draw between unilateral patriation's legal and constitutional status forced another round of negotiations, in particular because the federal government could not predict how the UK might respond. 66 Again it pressed a referendum option as a strategy for bargaining against the sovereignty claims of the provinces. 67 Not surprisingly, but with one critical exception, the provinces were uniformly opposed to a proposal that would deflect and diminish their importance in the process of of nine judges agreed that the federal government had the legal power to proceed unilaterally, with two dissenting strongly to defend the integrity of Canadian federalism. A differently constituted majority of six judges then found that the patriation plan was unconstitutional because it violated a domestic constitutional convention that required an indeterminate but "substantial" level of provincial agreement. Three judges dissented strongly on the ground that such a constraint was unprecedented and unrecognized in constitutional law.
amendment. 68 Agreement on patriation without democratic participation was reached when the federal government abandoned a referendum in exchange for consent from all provinces but Quebec. 69 As a matter of political calculation, the rest-of-Canada leadership concluded that the patriation package was legitimate enough because the Court was unwilling to endorse a constitutional requirement of unanimity. 70 Despite satisfying the Court's standards of legality and legitimacy, the patriation plan provoked resistance, not only in Quebec but from powerful rights-seeking members of Canada's democratic community.
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Patriation came in 1982 at high cost: Quebec was dealt an unforgivable insult that largely robbed patriation of legitimacy in that province and radically escalated the danger of separation. 72 Quebec's exclusion and the gaping legitimacy deficit it caused set off a chain 68 All provinces, except Quebec -in a moment of unguarded weakness -were opposed because a referendum would fundamentally re-focus the source of legitimacy for change on the democratic community, through a process managed by the federal government.
reaction that further imperilled the fragile status of constitutional reform and threatened the Constitution's durability as a nation. On its face, the Meech Lake Accord ("MLA") was a wellintentioned reform initiative aimed at completing patriation by healing the wounds of 1982 through a "Quebec Round" redressing the province's grievances. 73 Unanimous agreement at the level of executive federalism anchored the Accord's legitimacy, gestured in humility toward amend-making with Quebec, and at least initially augured well for the MLA's acceptance.
By courting Quebec's agenda, entertaining asymmetric arrangements, and privileging
Quebec as a distinct society, the MLA ignored pent-up demands and expectations for movement on women's and aboriginal rights, as well as Senate Reform. 74 Over the three-year ratification period from 1987 to 1990, the legitimacy of prioritizing Quebec and in the meantime sidelining other issues steadily declined. 75 Process deficits were a further and important aggravation: the MLA process was closed, lacking in transparency, and non-inclusive; it shut out newly enacted legislation overriding the Charter across the spectrum of provincial statute law; An Act respecting the Constitution Act, 1982 Act, , S.Q. 1982 The MLA proposed amendments that recognized Quebec as a distinct society; required the federal government to grant provinces a greater role in immigration and to select Supreme Court of Canada judges from lists of names from the provinces; entrenched Quebec's right to three judges on the Court; and allowed the provinces to opt out of share cost programs, under certain conditions; and granted all provinces a veto on s. empowered voices that had the resources, political will and visibility to confront the bygone legitimacy of executive federalism. Three years after its announcement was celebrated the Accord failed for want of ratification on June 23, 1990. Unanimity was required as a matter of legality and the Manitoba and Newfoundland legislatures refused to ratify the MLA at the last minute.
Accounts of the Accord's failure abound, and include attention to the obstacles arising from the legalities of amendment, which set a three-year time period and required all provincial legislatures and the federal government to ratify the agreement. 76 More telling than legality's obstacles were the MLA's legitimacy defects and miscalculations. 77 As one observer commented, "the Constitution [was] no longer an affair of governments" and not only had federalism "lost status in the Constitution as an organizing principle", there was outrage at the "illegitimacy of governments perceived as playing fast and loose with a Constitution which they had forgotten was no longer theirs alone".
78 76 See, e.g., Monahan, ibid.; Cohen, Meech Lake Accord, supra note 7 (pointing to the fundamental disconnect in the process between the political leadership and the electorate); Katherine Swinton, "Amending the Canadian Constitution: Lessons from Meech Lake", U. T.L.J., 42 (1992) , 139-169 at 144 ["Lessons from Meech Lake"] (pointing to changes in political will and provincial elections in New Brunswick, Manitoba and Newfoundland, which affected the MLA).
In a climate of escalating anxiety over Canada's future, Meech Lake's defeat simply make the next initiative inevitable. Quebec issued an ultimatum that brought urgency to the task of accommodating its minimum demands for constitutional amendments without repeating the mistakes of the MLA. 79 The "Canada Round" was the result of an expedited but nationally inclusive process of democratic renewal which proposed constitutional reforms across a range of institutional and substantive constitutional issues. 80 Addressing the substantive and procedural deficits of the MLA backfired, however, because the Accord's unwieldy reforms did not register as authentic in the democratic domain. Proposals which were inevitably and unavoidably dilute sounded in political expedience and inspired more antagonism than generosity. 81 Following an intense campaign the Accord was defeated in a national referendum held on October 26, 1992, which conclusively rejected the proposal. 82 Paradoxically, while the MLA failed because it was under-inclusive, the Charlottetown Accord was over-inclusive to a fault. In the aftermath of failed reform, the amendment process was "deeply dysfunctional"
because managing concurring and competing legitimacies spun out of control and created a "widespread sense of powerlessness" and a perception that constitutional change had been rendered impossible. 86 Time has not substantially altered that assessment, and though it is open to serious doubt that adding layers of legality will boost the legitimacy of constitutional reform, the issue may be academic. Canada's Constitution has become among the most rigid and most 85 Extra-textual constraints aimed at enhancing the legitimacy of amendment complicate and obscure the process, and delegitimize the textual rules for change. See Albert, "Formal Amendment Difficulty", supra note 33 at 17-18 (draft) (explaining that these extra-textual restrictions are harmful for the rule of law because they "breed doubt" about the text itself, effectively amend Part V's rules, and in doing so, compound the rigidity and uncertainty of constitutional amendment's requirements). Possible solutions include returning to and treating Part V as a complete code for constitutional change, or amending Part V to include a referendum process in the legality of amendment. Such a requirement might not make reform more likely to succeed, but would address a perceived legitimacy gap and create textual certainty around what is required for constitutional renewal.
difficult to amend in the world. 87 There is little doubt that reform cannot realistically be initiated again until the legality and legitimacy of constitutional amendment are better aligned.
Legality, legitimacy and amendment rigidity
If not entirely anomalous in the time and place of Confederation, the Constitution's failure to provide amendment rules was incapacitating over time. Negotiating a textual formula after independence was essentially an exercise in defining the nation's sovereignty because constitutional rules are "the most basic expression of the legal nature of the country". 88 By the time of the patriation crisis, the protracted lack of consensus on that core question of constitutional sovereignty showed, contrary to perception, that Canada's independence after 1931 may have been "illusory" and that the roots of our legal existence were "virtually untraceable". 89 The terms of independence would and could not be determined until conflict and confrontation forced a resolution that was costly for constitutional legitimacy.
The impasse on amendment was an impasse on legality, on legitimacy, and, more fundamentally, on how Canadian constitutional sovereignty should be defined. In circumstances of deeply divergent conceptions of constitutionalism, perhaps the impasse could only be broken by a frontal challenge to entrenched assumptions about the role of the provinces in the process of 87 Richard Albert, "The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada", supra note 8 (arguing that in combination Canada's formal and extra-textual requirements makes the constitution "exceedingly rigid" and perhaps more rigid than the US Constitution).
constitutional amendment. 90 To continue the speculation, the legitimacy fallout from patriation might have been averted had the proposal for a referendum been more a matter of conviction than a bargaining ploy. It is not difficult to imagine how the legitimizing influence of popular ratification might have altered the patriation narrative and the Constitution's evolution after 1982. 91 To further probe the follies of amendment in this period, the Constitution's legitimacy sorrows also might not have deepened, after 1982, had the Meech Lake Accord not attempted heroics to reconcile Quebec to the Constitution and, in doing so, profoundly misread the mood of the country. And had some of these missteps been avoided, the spectacle of Charlottetown's defeat in a national referendum might have been spared. The legitimacy deficits that haunt the process today might be attenuated, if not all but eliminated.
Patriation and the Accords were high-stakes initiatives, and each gambled in its own way on the legitimacy of constitutional reform. Legitimacy deficits that were unquestionably situational found strong voice in the fractures, expectations, demands and emotions in play at a time when Canada's survival was in peril. Those dynamics spiralled during the patriation crisis and could not be contained when the follow-up Accords were proposed. These "current states of affairs" or factual rigidities are compelling, but do not separate the post-textual period from the 90 As then Prime Minister Trudeau shrugged, "My answer is there had been a hell of a lot of nice guys since 1926 … and the constitution was never patriated. Maybe it took a nasty guy". Graham, The Last Act, supra note 7, pp. 41. 91 See generally Russell, Odyssey, supra note 7 (sub-titled, Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?); see also Bruce Ackerman and Robert Charney, "Canada at the Crossroads", U. T.L.J., 34:2 (1984) , 117-135 (stating that, "although aware of the legitimating power of a national referendum" (129), the referendum proposal was "compromised away" and "rather than appeal to the People … Trudeau merely appealed to his fellow parliamentary sovereigns"); McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution, supra note 7 (describing the "'people's' route, via a referendum … as one of the great 'might-have-beens' of the patriation conflict).
longer history of constitutional amendment. 92 Rather, it has been a central purpose of this article to show that Canada's experience of amendment in and after 1982 is vitally connected to the primal challenge since Confederation in 1867, and that has been to define the terms of Canada's amendment sovereignty. That could and can only be done by bringing the legality and legitimacy of constitutional change into alignment.
As noted above, a flourishing literature on amendment theory analyzes textual variables to determine, by quantitative and comparative measures, how amendment rules predict or determine the rigidity of constitutional change. 93 It is telling that Part V's amendment rules place
Canada at the end of the textual spectrum for amendment rigidity, but even more telling that a textual measure can so dramatically understate the obstacles to constitutional change. In principle, textual singularity is incomplete as a measure of amendment rigidity because it fails to a host of non-quantitative elements -including situational or factual rigidities -which may play a determinative role in enabling and disabling constitutional change. 94 Significantly, it also fails to account for amendment rigidities which are grounded in legitimacy deficits that compromise or subvert the process of change. These points have particular salience for Canada's amendment history.
In Canada's case, the rigidity of constitutional amendment reveals an intriguing interaction of textual and non-textual elements. If it is agreed that Part V's rules set Canada's 92 Fallon, "Legitimacy", supra note 21. See also Contiades and Fotiadou, supra note 14, pp. 460 (referring to these as "factual rigidities").
93 Supra note 13.
94 Supra note 14.
scheme of constitutional legality at the rigid end of the amendment spectrum, it can now be noted that a different kind of rigidity characterizes the pre-textual regime of statutory legality.
That rigidity is negative rather than positive in nature because it arose, not from the constraints of rules, but from their absence and its implications for the process of amendment. In addition, Canada's amendment history experienced non-textual rigidities arising from the negative rigidity of text, in the form of deficits in constitutional legitimacy. The inability to articulate and agree on a scheme of amendment legality was a failure in the legitimacy of amendment which created conditions of extreme rigidity. That cycle of dysfunction could and would not be broken without the conflicts of patriation and the two Accords. In addition to the textual rigidities of Canada's complex requirements of constitutional and statutory legality, the rigidities associated with unresolved legitimacy deficits remain in place today.
This, then, is the object lesson for Canada, and for theories of amendment and amendment rigidity more generally. Just as a regime of legality is necessary to legitimize amendments to a constitutional text, legality has limits and is not sufficient where extra-textual legitimacy deficits undermine the authority and acceptability of constitutional change.
